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Generating Station

**Technical Specification 5.5.14**  
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102-04853 SAB/TNW/DWG  
October 18, 2002

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Mail Station P1-37  
Washington, DC 20555-0001

Dear Sirs:

**Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)  
Units 1, 2, and 3  
Docket Nos. STN 50-528/529/530  
Technical Specifications Bases Revision 20 Update**

Pursuant to PVNGS Technical Specification (TS) 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," Arizona Public Service Company (APS) is submitting changes to the TS Bases incorporated into Revision 20, implemented on October 18, 2002. The Revision 20 insertion instructions and replacement pages are provided in the Enclosure.

No commitments are being made to the NRC by this letter.

Should you have any questions, please contact Thomas N. Weber at (623) 393-5764.

Sincerely,

SAB/TNW/DWG/kg

Enclosure: PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 20  
Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages

cc: E. W. Merschoff  
J. N. Donohew  
M. B. Fields  
N. L. Salgado

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A001

# **ENCLOSURE**

## **PVNGS Technical Specification Bases Revision 20**

### **Insertion Instructions and Replacement Pages**

**PVNGS Technical Specifications Bases**  
**Revision 20**  
**Insertion Instructions**

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B 3.8.1-39/B 3.8.1-40


***PVNGS***

*Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station*

*Units 1, 2, and 3*

# Technical Specification Bases

Revision 20  
October 18, 2002



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B 3.7.9-1	0	B 3.8.1-18	20
B 3.7.9-2	1	B 3.8.1-19	20
B 3.7.9-3	0	B 3.8.1-20	20
B 3.7.10-1	10	B 3.8.1-21	20
B 3.7.10-2	1	B 3.8.1-22	20
B 3.7.10-3	1	B 3.8.1-23	20
B 3.7.10-4	1	B 3.8.1-24	20
B 3.7.11-1	0	B 3.8.1-25	20
B 3.7.11-2	0	B 3.8.1-26	20
B 3.7.11-3	1	B 3.8.1-27	20
B 3.7.11-4	10	B 3.8.1-28	20
B 3.7.11-5	10	B 3.8.1-29	20
B 3.7.11-6	10	B 3.8.1-30	20
B 3.7.12-1	1	B 3.8.1-31	20
B 3.7.12-2	1	B 3.8.1-32	20
B 3.7.12-3	10	B 3.8.1-33	20
B 3.7.12-4	10	B 3.8.1-34	20
B 3.7.13-1	0	B 3.8.1-35	20
B 3.7.13-2	0	B 3.8.1-36	20
B 3.7.13-3	0	B 3.8.1-37	20

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B 3.8.5-1	1	B 3.9.4-4	0
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B 3.8.8-5	1		
B 3.8.9-1	0		
B 3.8.9-2	0		
B 3.8.9-3	0		

BASES

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BACKGROUND (continued) certain anticipated operational occurrences (A00s) and design basis accidents (DBAs), the voltage to ESF buses PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 would change as a result of one or more of the following three automatic operations: (1) tripping of the generating unit, (2) fast bus transfer of the non-Class 1E distribution system to the startup transformers, and (3) powering of the ESF loads by the automatic load sequencer. Analyses have been performed to determine the magnitude of voltage change due to each of these operations. Under conditions where these voltage changes would result in either inadequate voltages to the ESF equipment or tripping of the degraded voltage relays, the guidance from Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) is not met and the affected offsite circuit(s) do not meet their required capability:

Tripping of a Palo Verde unit can result in either a decrease or increase in the switchyard voltage due to the change in the flow of volt-amperes reactive (VARs) into or out of the electrical grid. If two or more of Palo Verde units are on line and available to regulate switchyard voltage, the voltage will not change significantly following tripping of one unit. If only one unit is on line, is not providing switchyard voltage support (generator gross MVAR output  $\leq 0$ ); and it trips, the post-trip switchyard voltage will be equal to or greater than the pre-trip switchyard voltage. If it had been providing switchyard voltage support (generator gross MVAR output  $> 0$ ) the post-trip switchyard voltage could be lower than the pre-trip switchyard voltage. In this case, adequate voltage to the Class 1E buses is assured by blocking fast bus transfer and thus minimizing the loading and voltage drop on the startup transformer secondary circuit.

Voltage analyses also conclude that the maximum switchyard voltage should not exceed 535.5 kV. However, even if this limit is exceeded, the offsite circuits still have the capability to effect a safe shutdown, mitigate the effects of an accident, and continue to meet the operability requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6). Although sustained overvoltages can cause accelerated aging of electrical equipment, this would not cause catastrophic equipment failure or unavailability. Furthermore, an overvoltage condition can be corrected quickly by adjustment

(continued)

BASES

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BACKGROUND  
(continued)

of the MVAR output of the Palo Verde generator(s).  
Therefore, there is no LCO for high switchyard voltage.

Grid frequency can also affect the operation of safety equipment. For example, sustained high frequency can result in an excessive differential pressure across motor operated valves, and sustained low frequency can result in substandard pump flow. There are no LCOs for offsite circuit frequency, because the grid frequency is continuously monitored and maintained within a tight tolerance by non-Palo Verde organizations. These organizations utilize various automatic and manual methods to control frequency, such as maintaining a spinning reserve, load shedding, and turbine-governor controls. Analyses, as discussed in UFSAR Section 8.2.2 (Ref. 2), and operating experience have demonstrated that the tripping of a Palo Verde unit has a minimal effect on grid frequency.

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APPLICABLE  
SAFETY ANALYSES

The initial conditions of DBA and transient analyses in the updated FSAR, Chapter 6 (Ref. 4) and Chapter 15 (Ref. 5), assume ESF systems are OPERABLE. The AC electrical power sources are designed to provide sufficient capacity, capability, redundancy, and reliability to ensure the availability of necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, Reactor Coolant System (RCS), and containment design limits are not exceeded. These limits are discussed in more detail in the Bases for Section 3.2, Power Distribution Limits; Section 3.4, Reactor Coolant System (RCS); and Section 3.6, Containment Systems.

The OPERABILITY of the AC electrical power sources is consistent with the initial assumptions of the accident analyses and is based upon meeting the design basis of the unit. This results in maintaining at least one train of the onsite or offsite AC sources OPERABLE during accident conditions in the event of:

- a. An assumed loss of all offsite power or all onsite AC power; and
- b. A worst case single failure.

The AC sources satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

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(continued)

BASES

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LCO

Two circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class 1E Electrical Power Distribution System and separate and independent DGs for each train ensure availability of the required power to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition after an anticipated operational occurrence (AOO) or a postulated DBA.

Offsite circuits are those that are described in the updated FSAR and are part of the licensing basis for the unit.

In addition, one automatic load sequencer per train must be OPERABLE.

Each offsite circuit must be capable of maintaining rated frequency and voltage, and accepting required loads during an accident, while connected to the ESF buses.

The startup transformers (NAN-X01, NAN-X02, and NAN-X03) convert the 525 kV offsite power to the Non-Class 1E 13.8 kV power. Each secondary winding of a startup transformer normally provides power to one of two interconnected 13.8 kV intermediate buses (NAN-S05 & NAN-S06) per unit, in such a way that the two 13.8 kV intermediate buses of the same unit receive power from two different start-up transformers (preferred offsite sources: normal and alternate supply). For example, Unit 1 NAN-S05's normal supply is from a NAN-X03 secondary winding and NAN-S05's alternate supply is from a NAN-X01 secondary winding; Unit 1 NAN-S06's normal supply is from a NAN-X02 secondary winding and NAN-S05's alternate supply is from a NAN-X01 secondary winding. The secondary winding are sized to start and carry one-half of the non-Class 1E loads of one unit and two trains of ESF loads, one which is from another unit, during unit trips or during startup/shutdown operation.

The 13.8 kV intermediate buses (NAN-S05 & NAN-S06), in turn, distribute power to the 4.16 kV Class 1E buses (PBA-S03 & PBB-S04) via a 13.8 kV bus (NAN-S03 or NAN-S04) and an ESF transformer (NBN-X03 or NBN-X04).

Two fast bus transfer circuits are also provided to transfer the non-Class 1E house loads fed from NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 to 13.8 kV buses NAN-S03 and NAN-S04 respectively during a plant trip or during startup/shutdown operation. Prior to a plant trip, NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 are fed from the auxiliary transformer, and are fed from NAN-S03 and NAN-S04 respectively after the plant trip.

(continued)

BASES

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LCO  
(continued)

Each DG must be capable of starting, accelerating to rated speed (i.e., frequency) and voltage, and connecting to its respective ESF bus on detection of bus undervoltage. This will be accomplished within ( $\leq$ ) 10 seconds. Each DG must also be capable of accepting required loads within the assumed loading sequence intervals, and continue to operate until offsite power can be restored to the ESF buses. These capabilities are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby condition with the engine hot and DG in standby condition with the engine at normal keep-warm conditions. Additional DG capabilities must be demonstrated to meet required Surveillances (e.g., capability of the DG to revert to standby status on an ECCS signal while operating in parallel test mode).

Proper sequencing of loads, including tripping of nonessential loads, is a required function.

The AC sources in one train must be separate and independent (to the extent possible) of the AC sources in the other train. For the DGs, separation and independence are complete.

For the offsite AC sources, the separation and independence are to the extent practical. An offsite circuit may be connected to both 4.16 kV Class 1E buses (PBA-S03 & PBB-S04) and not violate separation criteria. While in this alignment, the associated 13.8 kV startup transformer secondary circuit must not be connected to any non-Class 1E house load bus (NAN-S01 or NAN-S02) nor have fast bus transfer capability to any such bus enabled. This restriction assures adequacy of voltage to ESF equipment. The offsite circuit that is not connected to either 4.16 kV Class 1E bus is inoperable.

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APPLICABILITY

The AC sources and sequencers are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to ensure that:

- a. Acceptable fuel design limits and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits are not exceeded as a result of AOOs or abnormal transients; and
- b. Adequate core cooling is provided and containment OPERABILITY and other vital functions are maintained in the event of a postulated DBA.

(continued)

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BASES

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ACTIONS

C.1 and C.2 (continued)

Condition C applies only when the offsite circuits are unavailable to commence automatic load sequencing in the event of a design basis accident (DBA). In cases where the offsite circuits are available for sequencing, but a DBA could cause actuation of the Degraded Voltage Relays, Condition G applies.

D.1 and D.2

Pursuant to LCO 3.0.6, the Distribution System ACTIONS would not be entered even if all AC sources to it were inoperable resulting in de-energization. Therefore, the Required Actions of Condition D are modified by a Note to indicate that when Condition D is entered with no AC source to a train, the Conditions and Required Actions for LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating," must be immediately entered. This allows Condition D to provide requirements for the loss of one offsite circuit and one DG without regard to whether a train is de-energized. LCO 3.8.9 provides the appropriate restrictions for a de-energized train.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), operation may continue in Condition D for a period that should not exceed 12 hours.

In Condition D, individual redundancy is lost in both the offsite electrical power system and the onsite AC electrical power system. Since power system redundancy is provided by two diverse sources of power, however, the reliability of the power systems in this Condition may appear higher than that in Condition C (loss of both required offsite circuits). This difference in reliability is offset by the susceptibility of this power system configuration to a single bus or switching failure. The 12 hour Completion Time takes into account the capacity and capability of the remaining AC sources, a reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a DBA occurring during this period.

(continued)



BASES

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ACTIONS  
(continued)

E.1

With Train A and Train B DGs inoperable, there are no remaining standby AC sources. Thus, with an assumed loss of offsite electrical power, insufficient standby AC sources are available to power the minimum required ESF functions. Since the offsite electrical power system is the only source of AC power for this level of degradation, the risk associated with continued operation for a short time could be less than that associated with an immediate controlled shutdown (the immediate shutdown could cause grid instability, which could result in a total loss of AC power). Since any inadvertent generator trip could also result in a total loss of offsite AC power, the time allowed for continued operation is severely restricted. The intent here is to avoid the risk associated with an immediate controlled shutdown and to minimize the risk associated with this level of degradation.

According to Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6), with both DGs inoperable, operation may continue for a period that should not exceed 2 hours.

F.1 and F.2

The sequencer(s) is an essential support system to both the offsite circuit and the DG associated with a given ESF bus. Furthermore, the sequencer is on the primary success path for most major AC electrically powered safety systems powered from the associated ESF bus. Therefore, loss of an ESF bus sequencer affects every major ESF system in the load group. The 24 hour Completion Time provides a period of time to correct the problem commensurate with the importance of maintaining sequencer OPERABILITY. This time period also ensures that the probability of an accident (requiring sequencer OPERABILITY) occurring during periods when the sequencer is inoperable is minimal. Required Action F.2 is intended to provide assurance that a single failure of a DG Sequencer will not result in a complete loss of safety function of critical redundant required features.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

G.1 and G.2

To ensure offsite circuits will not be lost as a consequence of a DBE, certain conditions must be maintained. Failure to maintain these conditions may result in double sequencing should an accident requiring sequencer operation occur.

An offsite circuit meets its required capability by maintaining either of the following conditions:

1. Steady-state switchyard voltage at or above the minimum level needed to support the offsite circuit's functions. The minimum allowable voltage is the value calculated as follows or 528.5 kV, whichever is less:

Base minimum voltage (provides for emergency loads on PBA-S03 or PBB-S04 and house loads on NAN-S01 or NAN-S02)		518 kV
If the offsite circuit is connected to 1-E-NAN-S05 or 1-E-NAN-S06	add	6.5 kV
If the house load group associated with the offsite circuit is connected to both NBN-S01 and NBN-S02 (tie breaker NBN-S01C closed)	add	4 kV
If the offsite circuit is connected to another unit's PBA-S03 or PBB-S04	add	1.5 kV

This option does not apply if the unit under review is the only Palo Verde unit synchronized to the 525 kV switchyard and its main generator gross MVAR output is > 0 or if the offsite circuit is connected to both PBA-S03 and PBB-S04 in the same unit.

The values used to calculate minimum allowable voltage are based on calculations 01, 02, 03-EC-MA-0221 that analyze many different bus alignment conditions. The values are conservative, with sufficient margin to account for analytical uncertainties and to provide assurance that the degraded voltage relays will not actuate as a result of an accident.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

G.1 and G.2 (continued)

The highest minimum voltage of 528.5 kV is based on management of the loading of the startup transformer secondary windings to not exceed their rated 70 MVA capacity during a design basis event. When two units are sharing a secondary winding, the associated tie breaker NAN-S03B or NAN-S04B must always be open and fast bus transfer control switch NAN-HK-S03B or NAN-HK-S04B in "Manual" position in at least one of the units.

Meters A-E-MAN-EI-001 and A-E-MAN-EI-002 are used to monitor switchyard voltage. The allowable values take into account metering uncertainties. A voltage dip lasting 35 seconds or less is considered a transient, rather than steady-state condition based on the credited 35 second time delay of the degraded voltage relay. The time delay feature on the meters' alarms may be set up to 35 seconds to avoid nuisance alarms.

2. Associated tie breaker NAN-S03B or NAN-S04B to house load buses NAN-S01 or NAN-S02 open and fast bus transfer control switch NAN-HK-S03B or NAN-HK-S04B in "Manual" position. When two units are sharing a startup transformer secondary winding, this condition must be met in both units.

If the required capability in Condition G is not met, the effects of an AOO or DBA could cause further depression of the voltage at the ESF bus and actuation of the degraded voltage relays. These actuations would result in disconnection of the bus from the offsite circuits. Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) defines this condition as "The Available Offsite Power Sources Are One Less Than the LCO" or "The Available Offsite AC Power Sources Are Two Less Than the LCO," depending on the number of affected circuits. However, degraded post-trip voltage could also cause ESF electrical equipment to be exposed to a degraded condition during the degraded voltage relay time-out period. There is a risk that equipment misoperation or damage could occur during this time. In this scenario, the ESF equipment may not perform as designed following an automatic disconnection of the offsite circuits and reconnection to the diesel generators (DGs), even though adequate power is available from the DG. For certain DBAs, an additional consideration

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS

G.1 and G.2 (continued)

is that the initial sequencing of the ESF equipment onto the offsite circuits, subsequent tripping of the degraded voltage relays, and interruption in equipment credited in the UFSAR Chapter 6 and 15 safety analyses could challenge the credited equipment response times. Therefore, it is appropriate to implement Required Actions that are more stringent than those specified in Condition A or C.

If the required capability in Condition G is not met, the following options are available to restore full or partial Operability. Options are listed in their order of preference.

1. Achieve Condition 1 as discussed above (switchyard voltage at or above the minimum allowable value). This is accomplished by either of the following:
  - Increase switchyard voltage. If more than one Palo Verde unit is operating, switchyard voltage is increased by increasing MVAR output of any Palo Verde unit, or by any number of methods implemented by the Energy Control Center. If only one Palo Verde unit is operating, switchyard voltage is increased by any number of methods implemented by the Energy Control Center while maintaining the generator gross MVAR output of the Palo Verde unit to  $\leq 0$ .
  - Reduce minimum allowable voltage as calculated above. This is achieved by realignment of equipment power sources, if such an option is available.
2. Achieve Condition 2 as discussed above. This is accomplished by ensuring the affected tie breaker (NAN-S03B or NAN-S04B) is open and the fast bus transfer control switch (NAN-HK-S03B or NAN-HK-S04B) is in the "Manual" position. If two units are sharing a startup transformer secondary winding, this condition must be achieved in both units. Although Palo Verde has no formal restrictions on the amount of time that fast bus transfer can be out of service, this option should be used judiciously in order to maintain forced circulation capability.

(continued)

BASES

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ACTIONS

G.1 and G.2 (continued)

3. Transfer the safety bus(es) to the diesel generator(s). This is less desirable than option 2, because it would perturb the plant. It would cause the plant to remain in an LCO 3.8.1 condition (A or C, depending on whether one or two buses are transferred).

Options 1 and 2 satisfy Required Action G.1, and Option 3 satisfies Required Action G.2. With more than one offsite circuit that does not meet the required capability, Condition G could be satisfied for each offsite circuit by the use of Required Action G.1 or G.2. The Completion Time for both Required Action G.1 and G.2 is one hour. The one hour time limit is appropriate and consistent with the need to remove the unit from this condition, because the level of degradation exceeds that described in Regulatory Guide 1.93 (Ref. 6) for two offsite circuits inoperable. The regulatory guide assumes that an adequate onsite power source is still available to both safety trains, but in a scenario involving automatic load sequencing and low voltage to the ESF buses, adequate voltage is not assured from any of the power sources for the following systems immediately after the accident signal has been generated (i.e., while the degraded voltage relay is timing out): radiation monitors Train A RU-29 or Train B RU-30 (TS 3.3.9), Train B RU-145; ECCS (TS 3.5.3); containment spray (TS 3.6.6); containment isolation valves (TS 3.6.3); auxiliary feedwater system (TS 3.7.5); essential cooling water system (TS 3.7.7); essential spray pond system (TS 3.7.8); essential chilled water system (TS 3.7.10); control room essential filtration system (TS 3.7.11); ESF pump room air exhaust cleanup system (TS 3.7.13); and fuel building ventilation.

Required Action G.2 is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is to ensure that the offsite circuit is not inoperable for a time greater than the Completion Time allowed by LCO 3.8.1 Condition A or C. Therefore, if Conditions A or C are entered, the Completion Time clock for Conditions A and C would start at the Time Condition G was entered.

(continued)

BASES

ACTIONS  
(continued)

H.1 and H.2

If the inoperable AC electrical power sources cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the required Completion Time, the unit must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours and to MODE 5 within 36 hours. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

I.1

Condition I corresponds to a level of degradation in which all redundancy in the AC electrical power supplies has been lost. At this severely degraded level, any further losses in the AC electrical power system will cause a loss of function. Therefore, no additional time is justified for continued operation. The unit is required by LCO 3.0.3 to commence a controlled shutdown.

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

The AC sources are designed to permit inspection and testing of all important areas and features, especially those that have a standby function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18 (Ref. 8). Periodic component tests are supplemented by extensive functional tests during refueling outages (under simulated accident conditions).

The SR for demonstrating OPERABILITY of the DGs are based on the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), unless otherwise noted in the Updated FSAR Section 1.8.

The DG capabilities (starting and loading) are required to be met from a variety of initial conditions such as DG in standby condition with the engine hot (SR 3.8.1.15) and DG in standby condition with the engine at normal keep-warm conditions (SR 3.8.1.2, SR 3.8.1.7 and SR 3.8.1.19).

Although it is expected that most DG starts will be performed from normal keep-warm conditions, DG starts should be performed with the jacket water cooling and lube oil temperatures within the lower to upper limits of DG OPERABILITY, except as noted above. Rapid cooling of the DG down to normal keep-warm conditions should be minimized.

(continued)

BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

The required steady state frequency range for the DG is 60 +0.7/-0.3 Hz to be consistent with the safety analysis to provide adequate safety injection flow. In accordance with the guidance provided in Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), where steady state conditions do not exist (i.e., transients), the frequency range should be restored to within  $\pm 2\%$  of the 60 Hz nominal frequency (58.8 Hz to 61.2 Hz) and the voltage range should be restored to within  $\pm 10\%$  of the 4160 volts nominal voltage (3740 volts to 4580 volts). The timed start is satisfied when the DG achieves at least 3740 volts and 58.8 Hz. At these values, the DG output breaker permissives are satisfied, and on detection of bus undervoltage or loss of power, the DG breakers would close, reenergizing its respective ESF bus.

Steady state voltage and frequency limits have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. Error values for specific instruments are established by plant staff to derive the indicated values for the steady state voltage and frequency limits.

Specific MODE restraints have been footnoted where applicable to each 18 month SR. The reason for "This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1 or 2" is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the EDS that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems; or that performing the SR would remove a required DG from service. The reason for "This Surveillance shall not be performed in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4" is that performing this SR would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the EDS, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.1

This SR assures proper circuit continuity for the offsite AC electrical power supply to the onsite distribution network and indicated availability of offsite AC electrical power. The breaker alignment verifies that each breaker is in its correct position to ensure that distribution buses and loads are connected to their preferred power source, and that appropriate independence of offsite circuits is maintained. The 7 day Frequency is adequate since breaker position is not likely to change without the operator being aware of it and because its status is displayed in the control room.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7

These SRs help to ensure the availability of the standby electrical power supply to mitigate DBAs and transients and to maintain the unit in a safe shutdown condition.

To minimize the wear on moving parts that do not get lubricated when the engine is not running, these SRs are modified by a Note to indicate that all DG starts for these Surveillances may be preceded by an engine prelube period and followed by a warmup period prior to loading.

For the purposes of SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 testing, the DGs are started from standby condition. Standby conditions for a DG mean that the engine lube oil and coolant temperatures are maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations. Additionally, during standby conditions the diesel engine lube oil is circulated continuously and the engine coolant is circulated on and off via thermostatic control.

In order to reduce stress and wear on diesel engines, the DG manufacturer recommends a modified start in which the starting speed of DGs is limited, warmup is limited to this lower speed, and the DGs are gradually accelerated to synchronous speed prior to loading. This is the intent of Note 3, which is only applicable when such modified start procedures are recommended by the manufacturer.

The steady state voltage and frequency limits in SR 3.8.1.2 have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

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BASES

SURVEILLANCE  
REQUIREMENTS

SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

SR 3.8.1.7 Note 2 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.7 requires that, at a 184 day Frequency, the DG starts from standby conditions with the engine at normal keep-warm conditions and achieves required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds, and subsequently achieves steady state required voltage and frequency ranges. The 10 second start requirement supports the assumptions of the design basis LOCA analysis in the FSAR, Chapter 15 (Ref. 5).

A minimum voltage and frequency is specified rather than an upper and a lower limit because a diesel engine acceleration at full fuel (such as during a fast start) is likely to "overshoot" the upper limit initially and then go through several oscillations prior to a voltage and frequency within the stated upper and lower bounds. The time to reach "steady state" could exceed 10 seconds, and be cause to fail the SR. However, on an actual emergency start, the EDG would reach minimum voltage and frequency in  $\leq 10$  seconds at which time it would be loaded. Application of the load will dampen the oscillations. Therefore, only specifying the minimum voltage and frequency (at which the EDG can accept load) demonstrates the necessary capability of the EDG to satisfy safety requirements without including a potential for failing the Surveillance.

While reaching minimum voltage and frequency (at which the DG can accept load) in  $\leq 10$  seconds is an immediate test of OPERABILITY, the ability of the governor and voltage regulator to achieve steady state operation, and the time to do so are important indicators of continued OPERABILITY. Therefore, the time to achieve steady state voltage and

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SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7 (continued)

frequency will be monitored as a function of continued OPERABILITY.

The 10 second start requirement is not applicable to SR 3.8.1.2 (see Note 3) when a modified start procedure as described above is used. If a modified start is not used, 10 second start requirement of SR 3.8.1.7 applies.

Since SR 3.8.1.7 requires a 10 second start, it is more restrictive than SR 3.8.1.2, and it may be performed in lieu of SR 3.8.1.2. This is the intent of Note 1 of SR 3.8.1.2.

The normal 31 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.2 is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). The 184 day Frequency for SR 3.8.1.7 is a reduction in cold testing consistent with Generic Letter 84-15 (Ref. 7). These Frequencies provide adequate assurance of DG OPERABILITY, while minimizing degradation resulting from testing.

SR 3.8.1.3

This Surveillance verifies that the DGs are capable of synchronizing with the offsite electrical system and accepting loads of 90 to 100 percent (4950 - 5500 kW) of the continuous rating of the DG. Consistent with the guidance provided in the Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) load-run test description, the 4950 - 5500 kW band will demonstrate 90 to 100 percent of the continuous rating of the DG. The load band (4950 - 5500 kW) is meant as guidance to avoid routine overloading of the engine. Loads in excess of this band for special testing may be performed within the guidance of the generator capability curve.

A minimum run time of 60 minutes is required to stabilize engine temperatures, while minimizing the time that the DG is connected to the offsite source.

The normal 31 day Frequency for this Surveillance is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

This SR is modified by four Notes. Note 1 indicates that diesel engine runs for this Surveillance may include gradual loading, as recommended by the manufacturer, so that mechanical stress and wear on the diesel engine are minimized. Note 2 states that momentary transients because of changing bus loads do not invalidate this test. Note 3

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SR 3.8.1.3 (continued)

indicates that this Surveillance should be conducted on only one DG at a time in order to avoid common cause failures that might result from offsite circuit or grid perturbations. Note 4 stipulates a prerequisite requirement for performance of this SR. A successful DG start must precede this test to credit satisfactory performance.

SR 3.8.1.4

This SR provides verification that the level of fuel oil in the day tank is at or above the level at which fuel oil is automatically added. The level is expressed as an equivalent volume in gallons, and is selected to ensure adequate fuel oil for a minimum of 1 hour of DG operation at full load plus 10%.

The 31 day Frequency is adequate to assure that a sufficient supply of fuel oil is available, since low level alarms are provided and unit operators would be aware of any large uses of fuel oil during this period.

SR 3.8.1.5

Microbiological fouling is a major cause of fuel oil degradation. There are numerous bacteria that can grow in fuel oil and cause fouling, but all must have a water environment in order to survive. Removal of water from the fuel oil day tanks once every 92 days eliminates the necessary environment for bacterial survival. This is the most effective means of controlling microbiological fouling. In addition, it eliminates the potential for water entrainment in the fuel oil during DG operation. Water may come from any of several sources, including condensation, ground water, rain water, contaminated fuel oil, and from breakdown of the fuel oil by bacteria. Frequent checking for and removal of accumulated water minimizes fouling and provides data regarding the watertight integrity of the fuel oil system. The Surveillance Frequencies are established by Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9). This SR is for preventive maintenance. The presence of water does not necessarily represent failure of this SR provided the accumulated water is removed during the performance of this Surveillance.

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(continued)

SR 3.8.1.6

This Surveillance demonstrates that each required fuel oil transfer pump operates and transfers fuel oil from its associated storage tank to its associated day tank. This is required to support continuous operation of standby power sources. This Surveillance provides assurance that the fuel oil transfer pump is OPERABLE, the fuel oil piping system is intact, the fuel delivery piping is not obstructed, and the controls and control systems for automatic fuel transfer systems are OPERABLE.

Since the design of the fuel transfer system is such that pumps will operate automatically in order to maintain an adequate volume of fuel oil in the day tank during or following DG testing, a 31 day Frequency is appropriate.

SR 3.8.1.7

See SR 3.8.1.2.

SR 3.8.1.8

Transfer of each 4.16 kV ESF bus power supply from the normal offsite circuit to the alternate offsite circuit demonstrates the OPERABILITY of the alternate circuit distribution network to power the auto-connected emergency loads. The 18 month Frequency of the Surveillance is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration the unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.

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(continued)

SR 3.8.1.9

Each DG is provided with an engine overspeed trip to prevent damage to the engine. Recovery from the transient caused by the loss of a large load could cause diesel engine overspeed, which, if excessive, might result in a trip of the engine. This Surveillance demonstrates the DG load response characteristics and capability to reject the largest single load, or equivalent load, without exceeding predetermined voltage and frequency and while maintaining a specified margin to the overspeed trip. Train A Normal Water Chiller (at 842 kW) and Train B AFW pump (at 936 kW) are the bounding loads for the DG A and DG B to reject, respectively. These values were established in reference 14. This Surveillance may be accomplished by:

- a. Tripping the DG output breaker with the DG carrying greater than or equal to its associated single largest post-accident load while solely supplying the bus; or
- b. Tripping its associated single largest post-accident load with the DG solely supplying the bus.

As required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 11), the load rejection test is acceptable if the increase in diesel speed does not exceed 75% of the difference between synchronous speed and the overspeed trip setpoint, or 15% above synchronous speed, whichever is lower.

The time, voltage, and frequency tolerances specified in this SR are derived from Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3) recommendations for response during load sequence intervals. The 3 seconds specified is equal to 60% of a typical 5 second load sequence interval associated with sequencing of the largest load. The voltage and frequency specified are consistent with the design range of the equipment powered by the DG. SR 3.8.1.9.a corresponds to the maximum frequency excursion, while SR 3.8.1.9.b and SR 3.8.1.9.c are the voltage and frequency values the system must meet, within three seconds, following load rejection. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3).

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SR 3.8.1.9 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing this SR would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the EDS, and challenge safety systems. This SR is performed in emergency mode (not paralleled to the grid) ensuring that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible.

SR 3.8.1.10

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG capability to reject a full load without overspeed tripping or exceeding the predetermined voltage limits. The DG full load rejection may occur because of a system fault or inadvertent breaker tripping. This Surveillance ensures proper engine generator load response under the simulated test conditions. This test simulates the loss of the total connected load that the DG experiences following a full load rejection and verifies that the DG will not trip upon loss of the load. These acceptance criteria provide DG damage protection. While the DG is not expected to experience this transient during an event and continues to be available, this response ensures that the DG is not degraded for future application, including reconnection to the bus if the trip initiator can be corrected or isolated.

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design basis conditions as possible, testing is performed using design basis kW loading and maximum kVAR loading permitted during testing. These loads represent the inductive loading that the DG would experience to the extent practicable and is consistent with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Consistent with the guidance provided in the Regulatory Guide 1.9 full-load rejection test description, the 4950 - 5500 kW band will demonstrate the DG's capability to reject a load equal to 90 to 100 percent of its continuous rating. Administrative limits have been placed upon the Class 1E 4160 V buses due to high voltage concerns. As a result power factors deviating much from unity are currently not possible when the DG runs parallel to the grid. To the extent practicable, VARs will be provided by the DG during this SR.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendation of Regulatory Guide 1.8 (Ref. 3) and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

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SR 3.8.1.10 (continued)

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbation to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.11

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.4, this Surveillance demonstrates the as designed operation of the standby power sources during loss of the offsite source. This test verifies all actions encountered from the loss of offsite power, including shedding of the nonessential loads and energization of the emergency buses and respective loads from the DG. It further demonstrates the capability of the DG to automatically achieve the required voltage and frequency within the specified time.

The DG auto-start time of 10 seconds is derived from requirements of the accident analysis. The Surveillance should be continued for a minimum of 5 minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved.

The requirement to verify the connection and power supply of permanent and auto-connected emergency loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the DG loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or shutdown cooling (SDC) systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified to the extent possible ensuring power is available to the component.

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SR 3.8.1.11 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by four Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 states that momentary voltage and frequency transients induced by load changes do not invalidate this test. Note 4 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12); and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.12

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG automatically starts and achieves the required voltage and frequency within the specified time (10 seconds) from the design basis accident signal (LOCA) signal, and subsequently achieves steady state required voltage and frequency ranges, and operates for  $\geq 5$  minutes. The 5 minute period provides sufficient time to demonstrate stability. SR 3.8.1.12.d and SR 3.8.1.12.e ensure that permanently connected loads and auto-connected emergency loads (auto-connected through the automatic load sequencer) are energized from the offsite electrical power system on an ESF signal without loss of offsite power.

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SR 3.8.1.12 (continued)

The requirement to verify the connection of permanent and auto-connected emergency loads is intended to satisfactorily show the relationship of these loads to the offsite circuit loading logic. In certain circumstances, many of these loads cannot actually be connected or loaded without undue hardship or potential for undesired operation. For instance, ECCS injection valves are not desired to be stroked open, high pressure injection systems are not capable of being operated at full flow, or SDC systems performing a decay heat removal function are not desired to be realigned to the ECCS mode of operation. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the offsite circuit system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified to the extent possible ensuring power is available to the component.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with the expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that performing this SR would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the EDS, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

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REQUIREMENTS  
(continued)

SR 3.8.1.13

This Surveillance demonstrates that DG and its associated 4.16 KV output breaker noncritical protective functions (e.g., high jacket water temperature) are bypassed on a loss of voltage signal concurrent with an ESF actuation test signal, and critical protective functions (engine overspeed, generator differential current, engine low lube oil pressure, and manual emergency stop trip), trip the DG to avert substantial damage to the DG unit. The noncritical trips are bypassed during DBAs and provide an alarm on an abnormal engine condition. This alarm provides the operator with sufficient time to react appropriately. The DG availability to mitigate the DBA is more critical than protecting the engine against minor problems that are not immediately detrimental to emergency operation of the DG.

The 18 month Frequency is based on engineering judgment, taking into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the SR when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, the Frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

The SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required DG from service.

SR 3.8.1.14

Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.9, requires demonstration once per 18 months that the DGs can start and run continuously at full load capability for an interval of not less than 24 hours,  $\geq 2$  hours of which is at a load equivalent to 105 to 110% of the continuous rating of the DG (5775 - 6050 kW) and  $\geq 22$  hours at a load equivalent to 90 to 100% of the continuous duty rating of the DG (4950 - 5500 kW). The DG starts for this Surveillance can be performed either from normal keep-warm or hot conditions. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR (Note 3 and Note 4).

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SR 3.8.1.14 (continued)

In order to ensure that the DG is tested under load conditions that are as close to design conditions as possible, testing is performed using design basis kW loading and maximum kVAR loading permitted during testing. These loads represent the inductive loading that the DG would experience to the extent practicable and is consistent with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3). Administrative limits have been placed upon the Class 1E 4160 V buses due to high voltage concerns. As a result, power factors deviating much from unity are currently not possible when the DG runs parallel to the grid. To the extent practicable, VARs will be provided by the DG during this SR. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloading may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.9, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This Surveillance is modified by four Notes. Note 1 states that momentary variations due to changing bus loads do not invalidate the test. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this Surveillance could cause perturbations to the electrical distribution systems that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. The provisions for prelubricating and warmup, discussed in SR 3.8.1.2, and for gradual loading, discussed in SR 3.8.1.3, are applicable to this SR (Note 3 and Note 4).

SR 3.8.1.15

This Surveillance demonstrates that the diesel engine can restart from a hot condition, such as subsequent to shutdown from normal Surveillances, and achieve the required voltage and frequency within 10 seconds, and subsequently achieves steady state required voltage and frequency ranges. The 10 second time is derived from the requirements of the accident analysis to respond to a design basis large break LOCA. The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.10.

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SR 3.8.1.15 (continued)

This SR is modified by three Notes. Note 1 ensures that the test is performed with the diesel sufficiently hot. The load band is provided to avoid routine overloading of the DG. Routine overloads may result in more frequent teardown inspections in accordance with vendor recommendations in order to maintain DG OPERABILITY. Per the guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.9, this SR would demonstrate the hot restart functional capability at full-load temperature conditions, after the DG has operated for 2 hours (or until operating temperatures have stabilized) at full load. Momentary transients due to changing bus loads do not invalidate the test. Note 2 allows all DG starts to be preceded by an engine prelube period to minimize wear and tear on the diesel during testing. Note 3 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

SR 3.8.1.16

As required by Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.11, this Surveillance ensures that the manual synchronization and load transfer from the DG to the offsite source can be made and that the DG can be returned to ready-to-load status when offsite power is restored. It also ensures that the auto-start logic is reset to allow the DG to reload if a subsequent loss of offsite power occurs. The DG is considered to be in ready-to-load status when the DG is at rated speed and voltage; in standby operation (running unloaded), the output breaker is open and can receive an autoclose signal on bus undervoltage, and the load sequence timers are reset.

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SR 3.8.1.16 (continued)

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), and takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.17

Demonstration of the test mode override ensures that the DG availability under accident conditions will not be compromised as the result of testing and the DG will automatically reset to ready-to-load operation if a LOCA actuation signal (e.g., simulated SIAS) is received during operation in the test mode. Ready-to-load operation is defined as the DG running at rated speed and voltage, in standby operation (running unloaded) with the DG output breaker open. These provisions for automatic switchover are required by IEEE-308 (Ref. 12), paragraph 6.2.6(2) and Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.13.

The requirement to automatically energize the emergency loads with offsite power is essentially identical to that of SR 3.8.1.12. The intent in the requirement associated with SR 3.8.1.17.b is to show that the emergency loading was not affected by the DG operation in test mode. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the emergency loads to perform these functions is acceptable.

This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The 18 month Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

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SR 3.8.1.18

Under accident and loss of offsite power conditions loads are sequentially connected to the bus by the automatic load sequencer. The sequencing logic controls the permissive and starting signals to motor breakers to prevent overloading of the DGs due to high motor starting currents. The 1 second load sequence time tolerance ensures that sufficient time exists for the DG to restore frequency and voltage prior to applying the next load and that safety analysis assumptions regarding ESF equipment time delays are not violated. FSAR, Chapter 8 (Ref. 2) provides a summary of the automatic loading of ESF buses.

The Frequency of 18 months is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.2.4, takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance, and is intended to be consistent with expected fuel cycle lengths.

This SR is modified by a Note. The reason for the Note is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems.

SR 3.8.1.19

In the event of a DBA coincident with a loss of offsite power, the DGs are required to supply the necessary power to ESF systems so that the fuel, RCS, and containment design limits are not exceeded.

This Surveillance demonstrates the DG operation, as discussed in the Bases for SR 3.8.1.11, during a loss of offsite power actuation test signal in conjunction with an ESF actuation signal. In lieu of actual demonstration of connection and loading of loads, testing that adequately shows the capability of the DG system to perform these functions is acceptable. This testing may include any series of sequential, overlapping, or total steps so that the entire connection and loading sequence is verified.

The Frequency of 18 months takes into consideration unit conditions required to perform the Surveillance and is intended to be consistent with an expected fuel cycle length of 18 months.

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SR 3.8.1.19 (continued)

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear and tear on the DGs during testing. For the purpose of this testing, the DGs must be started from standby conditions, that is, with the engine coolant and oil continuously circulated and temperature maintained consistent with manufacturer recommendations for DGs. The reason for Note 2 is that performing the Surveillance would remove a required offsite circuit from service, perturb the electrical distribution system, and challenge safety systems. Note 3 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and  $\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref.12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref.13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits

SR 3.8.1.20

This Surveillance demonstrates that the DG starting independence has not been compromised. Also, this Surveillance demonstrates that each engine can proper speed within the specified time when the DGs are started simultaneously.

The 10 year Frequency is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.9 (Ref. 3), paragraph 2.3.2.4 and Regulatory Guide 1.137 (Ref. 9).

This SR is modified by three Notes. The reason for Note 1 is to minimize wear on the DG during testing. The reason for Note 2 is that during operation with the reactor critical, performance of this SR could cause perturbations to the EDS that could challenge continued steady state operation and, as a result, unit safety systems. Note 3 states that the steady state voltage and frequency limits are analyzed values and have not been adjusted for instrument accuracy. The analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator voltage limits are  $\geq 4000$  and

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SR 3.8.1.20 (continued)

$\leq 4377.2$  volts and the analyzed values for the steady-state diesel generator frequency limits are  $\geq 59.7$  and  $\leq 60.7$  hertz. The indicated steady state diesel generator voltage and frequency limits, using the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation and adjusted for instrument error, are  $\geq 4080$  and  $\leq 4300$  volts (Ref. 12), and  $\geq 59.9$  and  $\leq 60.5$  hertz (Ref. 13), respectively. If digital Maintenance and Testing Equipment (M&TE) is used instead of the panel mounted diesel generator instrumentation, the instrument error may be reduced, increasing the range for the indicated steady state voltage and frequency limits.

REFERENCES

1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 17
2. Updated FSAR, Chapter 8
3. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3, "Selection, Design, Qualification and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants," July 1993.
4. Updated FSAR, Chapter 6
5. Updated FSAR, Chapter 15
6. Regulatory Guide 1.93, "Availability of Electric Power Sources," Revision 0, December 1974.
7. GL 84-15, "Proposed Staff Actions to Improve and Maintain Diesel Generator Reliability," July 2, 1984.
8. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 18
9. Regulatory Guide 1.137, "Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel Generators," Revision 1, October 1979.
10. ANSI C84.1-1982
11. IEEE Standard 308-1974, "IEEE Standard Criteria for Class 1E Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

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REFERENCE  
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12. Calculation 13-EC-PE-123, "Diesel Generator voltage meter loop E-PEN-EI-G01/G02 uncertainty calculation."
  13. Calculation 13-EC-PE-124, "Diesel Generator frequency meter loop E-PEN-SI-G01/G02 uncertainty calculation."
  14. Calculation 13-MC-DG-401
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